The operations of Pennsylvania government certainly are not inexpensive, nor are the industries that endeavor to influence those operations. It is incredibly big money, annually north of $25 billion on the government side alone. When there is that much money at play, there will always be opposing interests on how to spend those dollars. The mechanics of how that money gets spent is an interesting one, but surprisingly few people actually pay any attention at all, until something drastic occurs.
In 2005, a state government pay raise sparked cries from the public for reforms to what was seen as “business as usual” in Harrisburg. House and Senate rule changes prohibited voting past 11 p.m. and addressed other aspects of the legislative process; a Right to Know law was established and improved; and a new Lobbying Disclosure Act was adopted. Most recently, Gov. Tom Wolf enacted a gift ban for all employees under his control. The measures seemed to quell, at present, the public’s concerns over government openness and transparency. But has it really changed anything?
For our government to truly operate in the best interests of the people, it must be accountable to those it serves. Equitable and accountable application of the rules should not be a disguise or superficial. The rules must exist, carefully articulated in the law and crafted with their practical application in mind for the full impact of transparency and openness to carry prominence both in law and in cultural acceptance.
Many government outsiders say the influence of lobbyists should change. While one might argue the mindset of elected officials themselves necessitates change, lobbying and lobbyists seem like as good a place as any to start.
The current lobbying law set up a framework to continue discussions on how we hold accountable the actions of lobbyists in their interactions with elected officials. However, current law requires lobbying firms and principals (clients) to report aggregate amounts spent on direct and indirect communications, as well as aggregate totals for meals, entertainment, gifts and the like. So what? The numbers provide little accountability or context. For the public to find out what they really want to know (e.g., who the lobbyist is spending money on), an elected official must reach aggregate thresholds of $250 in gifts or $650 in meals and entertainment annually. Firms with many clients oftentimes spread expenses incurred with elected officials among all of their clients. By way of example, Lobbying Firm buys Senator X a $200 meal, which is then spread out among all 50 of the firm’s clients so each client accrues only $4 of aggregate spending on Senator X. Using this method, Lobbying Firm would have to take Senator X out for a meal in the same amount 163 times before a lobbying expense report would specifically name Senator X as a recipient of said entertainment.
What is the solution? So-called “dollar one reporting,” whereby lobbyists report every expense incurred with every elected official from the very first dollar. Some may opine that this would be overly burdensome on lobbyists; the truth is they should already have this system in place. If they don’t, how do they know when they hit the aggregate thresholds already in law?
The Lobbying Disclosure Act not only required the reporting in terms of dollars, but also in terms of representation of interests before elected officials. To that end, conflicts of interest are rightly prohibited—lobbyists are prohibited from representing two clients with conflicting interests. A lobbyist cannot fairly and justifiably represent People for Taxing Stuff and People Against Taxing Stuff. It is just common sense.
Utilizing the same concept, why does the law not prohibit the lobbyist from having other conflicts? The law does not prohibit a lobbyist from running political campaigns of elected officials. Lobbyists can represent People for Taxing Stuff and undertake political consulting work for Representative Y who opposes any taxes simultaneously, paid by two opposing interests, and yet the law allows it. Who is the lobbyist truly accountable to?
The solution is simple: prohibit lobbyists from also serving as paid political consultants, ensuring lobbyists are not utilizing either capacity to shortchange their clients. Further, give the law teeth and aggressively enforce. Penalties are prescribed in ethics laws not only to serve as a punishment, but, and perhaps more significantly, to serve as a deterrent to not adhering to that law. Penalties without enforcement are similarly no deterrent to not following the law. Even if deterred by the penalties, if one reasonably assumes nobody is watching, the law possesses little, if any, impact. The penalties in the current law are too lenient on would-be scofflaws, exacerbated by limited enforcement. Combined, the weakness in compliance leads to poor information available to the public, which naturally breeds further distrust. Providing stiffer penalties and adequately funding proper oversight and enforcement is a must if the law intends to promote transparency and accountability.
Not until we acquiesce to these and many other changes will Pennsylvania achieve meaningful culture changes in the state’s Capitol. Changes incur resistance as they impact the status quo and create real transparency in the process—and yes, even force elected officials to modify their thinking and behaviors. Regardless, one way or another, we all pay the cost absent meaningful change.
The authors are partners and associates with Greenlee Partners, a community publisher of TheBurg.
